The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration will tighten petrochemical process safety management as a result of a Phillips 66 Co. accident last year at Pasadena, Tex.
OSHA cited Phillips and a contractor, Fish Engineering & Construction Inc., for alleged violations of OSHA rules and proposed penalties totaling nearly $6.4 million as a result of the Oct. 23 explosions and fire at the plant site near Houston that killed 23 workers and injured more than 130 (OGJ, Apr. 30, p. 46).
Labor Sec. Elizabeth Dole said, "The catastrophe at the Phillips complex underscores the need for effective implementation of good safety management systems in the petrochemical industry."
In a report to President Bush, Dole said petrochemical industry accidents have resulted from lack of attention to recognition of hazards, poorly maintained equipment, poor planning, and unsafe work practices.
But the report stressed, "The most critical responsibilities for chemical process safety rest not with government agencies but with industry and especially with each petrochemical producer at each location or work-place."
HAZARDOUS SECTORS
The Dole report cited five processing sectors as having high potential for fire, explosion, or catastrophic release: natural gas liquids; plastic materials, synthetic resins, and nonvulcanizable liquids; synthetic rubber (vulcanizable elastomers); industrial organic chemicals; and petroleum refining.
Dole said that process safety management requires a written analysis of the hazards involved, communication of the information to employees and contractors, procedures for changing plant equipment and technology, safe operating procedures, a preventive maintenance program, a hot work permit system, and an action plan for emergencies.
OSHA this summer will expedite and issue a rule requiring comprehensive chemical process safety management plans for hazardous chemical processes.
In its chemical plant inspections, OSHA will give more emphasis to identifying the risk of catastrophic events. And it will work with the Environmental Protection Agency to develop a joint investigation strategy for catastrophic chemical accidents that affect plant workers and nearby residents.
OSHA also will sponsor a conference of labor, industry, and government agencies on lessons learned from the Phillips accident, including the results of a study on contract work in the petrochemical industry,
It will periodically issue bulletins alerting the industry on equipment failures and specific deficiencies in work practices, procedures, and systems, including recommended corrective actions.
WHAT HAPPENED
An OSHA report said, "The primary causes of the (Phillips) accident were failures in management of safety systems at the Houston chemical complex."
It noted that while a contractor's crew worked to clear polyethylene particles from a settling leg, a valve was opened, allowing more than 85,000 lb of gas to escape and be ignited.
After the explosion, a physical examination of the actuator mechanism for the valve showed-and FBI laboratory tests confirmed-that it was open at the time of the release.
Tests showed air hoses that supplied air pressure, by which the actuator mechanism opened or closed the valve, were connected in a reversed position.
The hoses, connected in that way, would open a closed valve even when the actuator switch was in the closed position.
OSHA said, "Established Phillips corporate safety procedures and standard industry practice require backup protection in the form of a double valve or blind flange insert whenever a process or chemical line in hydrocarbon service is opened.
"Phillips, however, at the local plant level, had implemented a special procedure for this maintenance operation that did not incorporate the required backup. Consequently, none was used Oct. 23."
OSHA added the valve actuator did not have its lockout device in place, hoses that supplied air to the actuator could be connected at any time although Phillips' operating procedure required they should never be connected during maintenance, and air hose connectors for the "open" and "closed" sides of the valve were identical, allowing the hoses to be cross-connected and permitting the valve to be opened when the operator intended to close it.
LAYOUT FOUND AT FAULT
OSHA said, "The site layout and the proximity of normally high occupancy structures, such as the control room and the finishing building, to large capacity reactors and hydrocarbon storage vessels also contributed to the severity of the event.
"The large number of fatally injured personnel was due in part to inadequate separation between buildings in the complex. Distances between process equipment were in violation of accepted engineering practices and did not allow personnel to leave the polyethylene plants safely during the initial vapor release. Nor was there sufficient separation between the reactors and the control room to carry out emergency shutdown."
The control room was destroyed by the initial explosion. OSHA found that of 22 victims' bodies recovered at the scene, all were lying within 250 ft of the vapor release point, and 15 of them were within 150 ft.
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