The U.S. and Iran

The U.S. and Iran last week inched away from the alienation that has hurt both countries for 18 years. The oil and gas industry should encourage them to sustain the welcome progress.

Overt signs of change came in a news conference remark by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, followed by an amicable response from U.S. President Bill Clinton.

Speaking after a Muslim summit in Tehran, Khatami said, "I take this opportunity to pay my respects to the great American people and hope to have a dialogue with the American people and about the United States in the not too distant future." Clinton said he would "like nothing better than have a dialogue with Iran as long as we can have an honest discussion of all the relevant issues." Neither side would comment on a report in the Israe* newspaper Haaretz that Iranian and U.S. officials met earlier in Europe.

Important steps

These were important steps. Khatami's movement away from the "great Satan" bluster central to official Iranian policy toward the U.S.-although not reflective of the popular mood-looked deliberate. It unlocked a crucial political door in the U.S., where the general view, officially promoted, is that Iran teems with radicals eager to make hostages of Americans.

And Clinton's cautious embrace of the overture moves the U.S. away from the belief that there are no Iranian moderates. The misconception, fostered by the Reagan administration's Iran-Contra fiasco, has poisoned U.S. policy toward Iran and led Washington, D.C., into the morass of economic sanctions unsupported by allies.

In the U.S. view, Iran is a political monolith responsible for political mischief committed anywhere by any Iranians. That would be unrealistic even if Iran had a stable government, which it does not. What Iran has had since its revolution of 1979 is a sometimes bloody power struggle. Some parties to that struggle are "moderate" in the sense that they can be accommodating and even hospitable to outsiders. And some factions are indeed corrupt, murderous, and sometimes connected, directly or otherwise, to the mercurial government.

Effective policy for the U.S., one likely to win the support of allies, would try to isolate not all Iranians but rather the corrupt and murderous among them. If that proves impractical, the U.S. at least should acknowledge the distinctions.

In fact, it cannot ignore the distinctions any longer. The lines have become clear. The Islamic clergy, led by Ayatollah A* Khamenei and based in the holy city of Qom, holds supreme authority. Yet Khatami holds the popular support that has mostly eluded the ruling clergy, especially since the 1989 death of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Supporting relaxation of Iran's stern cultural rules, Khatami won the presidency last May in a landslide election against a candidate backed by Qom.

So the power struggle now pits a comparatively few clerics with constitutional authority (and a record ranging from heavy-handedness to downright ruthlessness) against a technically subordinate president supported by most Iranians. Khatami apparently feels insulated by this popularity against retaliation from Qom for his heresy of saying nice things about Americans. Yet, in a possible sign of things to come, a revolutionary court arrested and imprisoned a token opposition politician the day the president spoke.

Tough issues remain

The U.S. should seize the moment. It should show support for Khatami by formally accepting his invitation and moving quickly to get meetings under way. It might even consider ending economic sanctions in order to show good faith and emphasize the need for dialogue to cover the tough issues that definitely remain. What the U.S. should not do regarding this economically and geopolitically important country is waste a chance to exert constructive influence on the ludicrous pretense that Iran harbors no moderates.

Copyright 1997 Oil & Gas Journal. All Rights Reserved.