The end game in Iraq

It is time to ponder the end game for new military action against Iraq.

The U.S. last week held firm to its demand that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein provide United Nations inspectors unconditional access to sites possibly used for the assembly of weapons. Its stance was proper. The world-especially those parts of it within range of Iraqi missiles-must be certain that Saddam's minions are not assembling chemical and biological weapons. The Iraqi president's behavior has done nothing but raise suspicion.

More stalling

Last week, Saddam approved "key elements" of a French overture in which U.N. arms experts would gain access to eight presidential palaces thought to be providing cover for weapons work. What he disliked about the proposal was unclear and unimportant. He was only stalling.

And in a bold gesture of sweeping irrelevancy, Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned that a military strike might ignite world war. White House officials dismissed the bluster as mistranslation by journalists.

Of course, a successful diplomatic settlement of the crisis would be nice. But until it rids Iraq of Saddam Hussein, which no one expects of it, diplomacy can't succeed. All it can do is give Saddam time to make more of what he is hiding. He will never have enough chemical and biological weapons to repel a full-scale military assault led by the U.S. But he might already be able to devastate his neighbors.

With Saddam in power, the question about war in Iraq is not whether but when. And the longer Saddam stalls, the more damage he will be able to inflict when hostilities begin.

Military action thus seems inevitable. And the U.S. has made clear that its use of force would aim not only at thwarting Saddam's capacity to make weapons of mass destruction but also at limiting his ability to threaten the Middle East. That's a gentle way of saying Saddam must go. When the attack begins, access to palaces will no longer be the issue.

What about the post-war clean-up, though? It could be uglier than the war itself. An Iraq without Saddam could become a Bosnia in the Middle East-a Bosnia with world-class oil potential.

Iraq's religious and ethnic fault lines are large and heavily pressured. Sunni Muslims rule but are a minority (no more than 37%). Shi'ites, representing as much as 65% of the population, have suffered oppression and displacement under Saddam. So have Kurds, who may account for 20% of all Iraqis. In northern Iraq, an elected Kurdish Assembly has existed since 1992, striving in vain for self-determination.

The religious and ethnic groups have often-conflicting political and tribal factions. At the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, no fewer than 23 groups called for removal of Saddam from power and elections. In a post-Saddam Iraq, therefore, internal struggles will be intense.

And it would be unreasonable to expect countries on Iraq's borders to let all that oil wealth fall to waste in a political meltdown. Some have political concerns that would keep them from standing idly by while Iraqis sort out their affairs. Turkey and Iran have restive Kurdish populations, too. Iran has strong ties to the Iraqi Shi'ites. To the south, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might feel obliged to come to the aid of dispossessed Iraqi Sunnis.

Who keeps order?

For all his inhumanity, Saddam does keep order in Iraq, which has the potential to fly apart when he leaves, however it happens. Such chaos in the world's most important oil-producing region is no pleasant prospect.

With welcome British support, the U.S. now seems serious about removing Saddam's bloody hand from the throats of Iraqis and about neutralizing his chemical and biological menace. But it should not count on quick withdrawal after a swift victory. To protect their interests and limit bloodshed, the U.S. and its allies probably will have to keep peace until whatever follows Saddam's autocracy has time to take shape and stabilize. It might take a while.

Copyright 1997 Oil & Gas Journal. All Rights Reserved.