OSHA PROPOSES BIG FINE AFTER HOUSTON BLAST

The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration has proposed fines totaling nearly $6.4 million for alleged safety violations relating to a fire and explosions at Phillips 66 Co.'s Houston Chemical Complex at Pasadena, Tex.

The Oct 23, 1989, accident killed 23 workers, injured more than 130 others, and devastated the complex's high density polyethylene unit (OGJ, Oct. 30, 1989, p. 20). OSHA said property damage was about $750 million.

OSHA issued citations for alleged willful and serious violations of federal safety law and regulations against Phillips and Fish Engineering & Construction Inc., a service contractor long associated with Phillips.

The agency charged that Phillips committed 566 willful violations-one for each employee at the plant-carrying proposed penalties of $10,000 each and nine serious violations totaling $6,200, for a combined total of $5,666,200.

Phillips Petroleum Co. Pres. Glenn A. Cox said, based on preliminary information, Phillips 66 will contest a number of OSHA's alleged violations.

The proposed penalties against Phillips are the second largest OSHA has proposed against a company for a single inspection. Last November it issued penalties totaling $7.3 million against USX Corp. for alleged violations at two steel plants.

OSHA alleged that Fish Engineering committed 181 willful violations at $4,000 each, 12 serious ones at $5,500, and one other than serious at $100 for a total of $729,600.

ACCIDENT RULED AVOIDABLE

Labor Sec. Elizabeth Dole said the first blast at the complex had the force of 2.4 tons of TNT and was equal to an earthquake with the magnitude of 3.5 on the Richter scale.

"This tragedy is magnified by the clear evidence that this explosion was avoidable had recognized safety procedures been followed," she said. "OSHA has uncovered internal Phillips documents that called for corrective action but were largely ignored."

OSHA chief Gerard F. Scannell said the findings should alert all employers in the industry that all possible steps must be taken to eliminate potential hazards.

RECORD CHECKED

Scannell said the main cause of the Pasadena accident was release of a mixture of four highly flammable process gases from an open valve between a reactor vessel and a product settling leg during maintenance operations.

Because of high pressure, about 99% of the reactor's contents or 85,000 lb of flammable gases escaped in a matter of seconds. A huge vapor cloud formed, traveled through the plant, then exploded when the cloud came in contact with an ignition source 1.5-2 min later.

Two other explosions followed, one 10-15 min later involving two 20,000 gal isobutane tanks, and another 25-45 min later involving a polyethylene reactor.

Scannell said contrary to Phillips' procedures as well as standard industry practice, there was no backup protection such as a double valve or a solid blind flange to protect against valve failure or untimely valve opening.

OSHA said its inspection history of Phillips operations in the region, which includes Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, showed 18 deaths and many hospitalizations prior to those of last fall.

VIOLATIONS CITED

Citing the specifics of alleged violations of federal safety rules (see table), Scannel said the general conclusion is "the plant's approach to safety and health has not been pursued with adequate management commitment."

Scannell said Fish has been the maintenance contractor almost exclusively at the Pasadena site for about 17 years, as well as at other Phillips sites.

"In this investigation," he said, "it has become apparent that Fish has become accustomed to tolerating safety and health violations at the site by Phillips as well as participating in those violations by knowing about them and not taking direct positive action to protect their employees."

Four of the fatalities and 52 of the injured worked for Fish.

The alleged violations against Fish were also issued under OSHA's general duty clause for failure to protect its 181 employees working at the site at the time from the danger of fire and explosion.

Specifically, OSHA said, Fish failed to require workers to consistently follow a "hot work permit" system prohibiting entry of vehicles and other possible sources of ignition in areas of possible flammable gas release.

OSHA defines willful violations as those committed with an intentional disregard of or indifference to requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. A serious violation is one in which there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result, and the employer knew or should have known of the hazard.

PHILLIPS' RESPONSE

Cox said in challenging the OSHA citations, Phillips "in no way is contradicting our concern for employee and community safety."

He said, "We have incorporated well-established industry standards and experience in the design and operation of company facilities. At no time have we compromised the safety of our workers, and therefore we take issue with OSHA's characterizing any of the violations as 'willful' acts."

Cox said Phillips had the lowest rate of lost workday injury cases in the U.S. petroleum industry in 1987 and 1988, and the Houston Chemical Complex had surpassed 5 million hr of working safely shortly before the Oct. 23 accident.

He noted Phillips cooperated fully with the OSHA investigation and had conducted its own inquiry.

"The Phillips 66 investigation has shown that the accident was the result of a departure from established routine procedures," Cox said. "We are thoroughly evaluating our procedures and training to determine how the possibility for error can be further minimized."

PLANT CONSTRUCTION

Meantime, with a rebuilding program under way, the first train of high density polyethylene production will start up this summer at Pasadena, marking Phillips 66's reentry into the U.S. polyethylene business.

The first train will have a capacity of 300 million lb/year. A second 300 million lb/year train will start up in fourth quarter 1990.

Phillips also plans a July 1991 start-up for another 600 million lb/year of polyethylene capacity, currently under construction, and was to complete plans early this year to add still another 600 million lb/year of polyethylene capacity at Pasadena (OGJ, Dec. 18, 1989, p. 21).