NTSB: New pipeline industry safety standards needed

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board has urged the pipeline industry to draft construction standards for pipeline crossings of flood plains and stream beds and periodically reassess those standards. It said the American Petroleum Institute should take the lead for drafting the standards, aided by the Association of Oil Pipe Lines and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America. NTSB's recommendations came in its report on pipeline ruptures after the San Jacinto River flooded

Sept. 16, 1996

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It said the American Petroleum Institute should take the lead for drafting the standards, aided by the Association of Oil Pipe Lines and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America.

NTSB's recommendations came in its report on pipeline ruptures after the San Jacinto River flooded near Houston during Oct. 14-21, 1994.

It noted 15-20 in. of rain fell in the region, resulting in flooding that far surpassed previous floods.

San Jacinto spill

NTSB said, "Due to the flooding, eight pipelines ruptured and 29 others were undermined both at river crossings and new channels created in the flood plain. More than 35,000 bbl of petroleum and petroleum products were released into the river.

"Ignition of the released products within flooded residential areas resulted in 547 people receiving (mostly minor) burns and inhalation injuries. The spill response costs were in excess of $7 million and estimated property damage losses were about $16 million."

The safety agency said the number of pipelines ruptured and damaged and the magnitude of the spills show the threats posed to public safety and the environment by pipeline transportation.

"Although one of the safest means for transporting petroleum, pipeline transportation also poses great risk potential to the environment because of the large volumes of hazardous liquids that can be released when a rupture occurs.

"Also, in a pipeline transport situation, as opposed to other transport options, there is a greater likelihood of releasing petroleum into environmentally sensitive areas.''

In its San Jacinto River study, NTSB concluded, "The design bases of most pipelines undermined or ruptured during the flood did not include study of the flood plain to identify potential threats. Rather, operators used only general design criteria applicable at the time the pipelines were installed.

"Standards for designing pipelines across flood plains are needed to define the multiple threats posed to pipelines and to address the research, study, and future considerations that must be used for designing pipelines and periodically reevaluating the integrity of their designs during their operating life.''

NTSB said most pipeline companies continued operating their lines across the San Jacinto without evaluating the capability of their lines to withstand the threats presented by the flood, and few took effective response actions to minimize the potential for product releases.

What's needed

NTSB said the Transportation Department's Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) should have required the pipelines to develop plans for responding to the threat but noted the response by local, state, and federal agencies to the emergency was well-managed and effective.

NTSB said RSPA needs to set requirements for rapid detection and shutdown of failed pipe segments, because industry has not adopted means for rapidly finding and closing failed segments.

"Risks to workers and the public were increased significantly when the unified (response) command conducted an in-situ burn without having in place appropriate checks and balances to ensure that approved procedures and requirements were followed explicitly."

It said there should be a national command structure and operational principles for teams responding to spills, noting that out-of-state teams responding to the San Jacinto spill caused problems because they were not familiar with the command structure and procedures used in the Galveston Bay area.

And NTSB said, "Many lessons on improving the area's spill response preparedness were not learned primarily because a comprehensive after-action critique was not conducted."