Safety words and actions

May 13, 2019
Even as the US Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement issued revised offshore blowout preventer and well-control regulations to remove what Department of Interior officials described as unnecessary regulatory burdens, both the US House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Government Accountability Office have been outlining shortcomings in pipeline safety and security mechanisms.

Even as the US Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement issued revised offshore blowout preventer and well-control regulations to remove what Department of Interior officials described as unnecessary regulatory burdens, both the US House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Government Accountability Office have been outlining shortcomings in pipeline safety and security mechanisms.

The House committee criticized the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration for not implementing more aspects of congressional mandates issued as part of 2011 and 2016 federal pipeline safety reauthorizations. Subcommittee hearings on preparing a replacement began May 1.

The 2011 law required pipeline operators to install leak detection systems on hazardous liquids pipelines, but PHMSA has yet to finalize a rule on the topic. Committee Chariman Frank Pallone Jr. (D-NJ) also noted that “the 2016 reauthorization…gave PHMSA emergency order authority to address imminent, industry-wide safety hazards that pose a threat to life or significant harm to property or the environment” but it had yet to do so. Pallone, however, allowed that a prescriptive cost-benefit analysis required since the law’s 1986 reauthorization hamstrings PHMSA’s ability to finalize rules.

GAO’s assessments, meanwhile, were part of a follow-up to its December 2018 report calling for reforms in the US Transportation Security Administration’s pipeline security program, established as part of the 2011 reauthorization. In that report GAO determined that TSA needed to address substantial weaknesses in the program, which had not been materially changed since its establishment.

The December report also noted that TSA did not have a documented regular process for reviewing and revising its guidelines. GAO recommended that TSA implement such a process, clarify guidelines for determining critical facilities by defining key criteria, and address workforce deficiencies, among other actions. Staffing levels for the administration’s pipeline security branch have ranged from one full-time equivalent in 2014 to six from fiscal years 2015-18.

Since the December report, TSA has outlined procedures for reviewing its guidelines, which GAO is reviewing to determine if they address the recommendation. TSA plans to complete development of a strategic workforce plan by July. Among the matters TSA’s workforce plan was tasked with addressing is the required level of cybersecurity expertise necessary to carry out its pipeline security responsibilities.

Pipeline risk assessments

GAO in December identified factors that likely limit the usefulness of TSA’s risk assessment methodology for prioritizing pipeline security reviews. For example, TSA has not updated its risk assessment methodology since 2014 to reflect current threats to the pipeline industry. Further, its sources of data and underlying assumptions and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs are not fully documented. GAO recommended that TSA update its risk ranking tool to include up-to-date data to ensure it reflects industry conditions and fully document the data sources, assumptions, and judgments that form the basis of the tool. As of April, TSA reported taking steps to address these recommendations. GAO is reviewing documentation of these steps to determine if they address the recommendations.

GAO further reported that conducting security reviews was the primary means for TSA to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to reduce pipeline security risks. TSA, however, has not tracked the status of key security review recommendations for the past 5 years, according to GAO. GAO recommended that TSA take steps to update information on security review recommendations and monitor and record their status, which TSA plans to address by November.

Lawful oversight

GAO’s December report and the progress status update issued earlier this month are an effort to gauge TSA’s success in applying standing federal law.

The pipeline industry is a diligent steward of its own performance, but it appears the federal agencies charged with its oversight require greater resources to be able to fully help in this effort.