Editorial: Saudi Arabia’s friends

Sept. 23, 2019
Disruption to the oil market is not the only jarring consequence of Sept. 14 aerial attacks on production facilities in Saudi Arabia. Hazy alliances now squirm into focus.

Disruption to the oil market is not the only jarring consequence of Sept. 14 aerial attacks on production facilities in Saudi Arabia. Hazy alliances now squirm into focus. The clarification highlights unsavory links between oil and weapons. And it might adjust vital relationships.

No one believes Iran’s denials of a role in sophisticated strikes against the Abqaiq crude-processing complex and Khurais oil field. Houthi rebels in Yemen claim responsibility. But no one believes them, either. The Houthis receive weapons and other support from Iran and could not have orchestrated the cruise-missile and drone strikes that slashed Saudi oil production by 5.7 million b/d. Saudi Arabia leads a coalition fighting the Houthis in retaliation for frequent militancy along its southern border.

Series of provocations

The incident follows a series of provocations attributed to the Islamic Republic. Targets have included four ships off Fujairah on May 12, two pump stations along Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline on May 14, two tankers in the Strait of Hormuz on June 15, and a US drone on June 20. Hurt economically by trade sanctions reinstated by the US, Iran might be lashing out. But, emboldened by meek response to the earlier adventures, it also might be asserting domination after its expansionist campaign in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, to which Iranian hegemony is anathema, has reason to worry.

Its troubles don’t stop there. Iranian missile capability bears the imprint of two countries important to Saudi Arabia: Russia and China, both of which crave greater influence in the Middle East. According to an August report by analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran’s Shahab series of liquid-fuel propellant missiles uses technology from Soviet-era Scud missiles. And the Islamic Republic based development of its Fateh series of solid-propellant missiles on technology from China.

Saudi Arabia cannot relish these affiliations with incoming explosives. Yet it, too, buys weapons from China, albeit in modest amounts. And in 2017, during an historic visit by King Salman to Moscow, it agreed to buy an S-400 air defense package from Russia. That purchase has not happened. But the agreement irritated Washington, which recently expelled Turkey from development of the F-35 fighter after it entered an S-400 deal and which worries about interest in the missile system from other allies, including Qatar and India.

Since its S-400 flirtation in Moscow, Saudi Arabia has agreed to a $15 billion purchase of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system from the US. But Russia isn’t giving up. After the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, President Valdimir Putin urged the kingdom to make “a wise decision” and buy the S-400 or S-300 system. “These will protect any Saudi infrastructure facilities securely,” he said.

Meanwhile, the oil market, panicked by the prospect of extended interruption of Saudi supply, received some relief from a late-Sept. 16 press conference at which Saudi officials predicted quick recovery. The energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, said more than half the disrupted production had restarted. And he said production capacity would rise beyond prestrike levels to 11 million b/d by the end of September and to 12 million b/d by the end of October. Called unreasonably optimistic by some analysts, the outlook nevertheless eased market fears about months of diminished supply.

Cautious response

Whatever the timing, Saudi production will return to normal. But the kingdom’s already dangerous relations with Iran can only worsen. And those with China and Russia can hardly improve. China is Saudi Arabia’s most important oil customer. And Russia is its most important—and perhaps most tenuous—partner in production restraint by 21 countries attempting to defend the value of crude.

At this writing, Saudi Arabia had not signaled how it might respond militarily to the Sept. 14 incursion or whether it would respond that way at all. The caution is commendable. It might prevent war. And it gives Saudi leaders time to ponder who their friends are