FORMER OPEC OFFICIAL: LONG MIDDLE EAST STALEMATE LIKELY

A long term stalemate is the most likely outcome of the Middle East crisis, according to a former official of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' secretariat; Massood V. Samii formerly the secretariat's head of finance and an OPEC economist for 8 years, contends that neither side in the Persian Gulf crisis arising from Iraq's Aug. 2 invasion and takeover of Kuwait is likely to back down. Further, both sides in the crisis have too much to lose to get involved in a war,

Oct. 1, 1990

3 min read

A long term stalemate is the most likely outcome of the Middle East crisis, according to a former official of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' secretariat;

Massood V. Samii formerly the secretariat's head of finance and an OPEC economist for 8 years, contends that neither side in the Persian Gulf crisis arising from Iraq's Aug. 2 invasion and takeover of Kuwait is likely to back down.

Further, both sides in the crisis have too much to lose to get involved in a war, he said.

Samii currently an associate professor in the graduate business school at New Hampshire College, Manchester, N.H., made the comments last month in a talk at the quarterly drilling-production outlook in Houston sponsored by Spears & Associates Inc., Tulsa.

UNPREDICTABLE EVENTS

Samii cautions, however, that in an area of the world where friends and foes can change quickly, unpredictable events can radically alter the future.

For example, he contends, an Iraq-Iran alliance could increase the chance of war by pooling a large share of OPEC production behind a land army of about million troops. Further, if fran's spiritual leader calls for a holy war to expel foreign troops from the region, it will be perceived as legitimizing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's claims to pan-Arab leadership, Samii said.

Conversely, a standoff could be undercut if activities by Iraq's Kurdish minority raises doubts about Hussein's internal control, even to the extent of forcing him from power. Samii sees Hussein's assassination as possible, not probable.

In a long term stalemate, countries opposed to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait will have the advantage, he said, Through cooperation, the rest of the world can adapt to the present situation, but Iraq's ability to adapt is severely limited, thus putting more pressure on Iraq and Saddam Hussein, Samii said.

WIDESPREAD CONFLICT

Although Samii sees war in the Middle East as unlikely, he claims a new set of problems involving many different countries will arise should armed conflict break out.

Open warfare likely will increase civil unrest in the region, which in turn could increase the possibility of terrorist activity in countries aligned with either side, especially against targets in the Middle East, Samii noted. In the event of violent internal turmoil, oil reserves of all countries in the region will be at risk, he contends.

If hostilities are occurring next summer, when more than 1 million Moslems are expected to make a pilgrimage to Mecca and other holy sites in Saudi Arabia, allied forces will face a serious security problem, Samii pointed out. That is especially true if Hussein manages to portray the conflict as Moslems against non-Moslems an rich, elite Moslem nations.

While a major, preemptive attack on Kuwait or Iraq by U.S. led forces isn't likely, Samii notes, a quick surgical strike, like that which deposed Manuel Noriega in Panama, is a scenario favored by some U.S. strategists. But he contends such a strike won't be effective against Iraq, a much larger, more complex better armed adversary.

"If it failed, there would be prolonged confrontation," Samii said. "And once fighting started, it would be difficult to contain.

"It would likely spread into other Moslem and Arab countries, and there would be movements against leaders supporting those (non-Moslem forces) fighting the Moslem countries," he said.

"In fact, if we go to war, we could end up redrawing the national boundaries of countries in the Middle East."