Security through change

June 29, 2015
At the start of this month the US Army published its "Energy Security & Sustainability (ES2) Strategy" report. 

At the start of this month the US Army published its "Energy Security & Sustainability (ES2) Strategy" report. Army Under-Sec. Brad R. Carson and Army Vice-Chief of Staff, Gen. Daniel B. Allyn explained in a letter to Army leaders that "the Army is evolving...to a perspective that considers the critical role of energy, water, and land resources as mission enablers" rather than constraints.

The report itself went on to describe how the Army can "use energy more efficiently by...modernizing buildings and utility systems, purchasing energy efficient vehicles, and using more renewable/alternative energy sources." The US Department of Defense has said it will secure 25% of its energy from renewable sources by 2025. This goal was codified in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. ES2 makes it clear that the Army's move in this direction is mission-based.

The Army, Air Force, and Navy have each pledged to generate 1 Gw of distributed renewable energy on their installations by 2025. "Unleashing war fighters from the tether of fuel and reducing our military installations' dependence on a costly and potentially fragile power grid will not simply enhance the environment," said Dorothy Robyn, then deputy undersecretary of defense, in May 2010 testimony before the US Senate, "it will significantly improve our mission effectiveness."

Jerrycans

The Army's concerns regarding energy supply are rooted in history. World War II combat vehicles required small containers that could be carried and poured by hand and moved around a battle zone by trucks. Germany designed what came to be known as the jerrycan under strict secrecy before its 1939 invasion of Poland. It was flat-sided and rectangular, consisting of two halves welded together with circumferential joints. It had three handles, enabling one man to carry two cans and pass one to another man in bucket-brigade fashion. Its capacity was about 5 gal. Its short spout was secured with a snap closure that could be propped open for pouring. And most important, the can's inside was lined with an impervious plastic material, allowing it to be used alternately for gasoline and water.1

This design was far superior to the vessel in US use at the time, an updated version of the War Department's World War I container; a cylindrical 10-gal can with two screw closures, requiring a wrench and funnel for pouring. When the War Department received a sample jerrycan-smuggled from Germany through India-in the summer of 1940, it built a poor replica, keeping the size, shape, and handles but ditching the lining, the snap closure, and the welded joints, which it replaced with rolled seams.1

Not much had changed in US battlefield fuel transport by September 1942. The second Battle of El Alamein, Egypt, loomed and the British Army wanted no part of a planned US Navy can. British Gen. Claude Auchinleck estimated that the 5-gal petrol tin used by the British Army at the time lost 30% of its contents simply through leaking.2 The toll in equipment and lives was even greater. But the Brits could only use what was available, and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery made sure he had enough gasoline to defeat the Germans by building expected waste into his plans.

The UK began mass production of the jerrycan in time to send 2 million to North Africa in early 1943. Millions more were ready by D-Day. And by VE Day some 21 million Allied jerrycans were scattered across Europe. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt observed in November 1944 that "without these cans it would have been impossible for our armies to cut their way across France at a lightning pace which exceeded the German Blitz of 1940."1

References

1. Daniel, R.M., "The Little Can That Could," www.jerrycan.com, Jan. 22, 2013.

2. Young, D., and Auchinleck, C., "Rommel: The Desert Fox," Harper Crest, New York, New York, 1950.