Nearly 7 years after the massive Exxon Valdez oil spill off Alaska, the U.S. is better prepared than ever to respond to such accidents.
Major oil companies have established an independent oil spill reaction force, Marine Spill Response Corp. (MSRC), which is fully functional. Its next largest competitor is the National Response Corp. And about 70 other smaller firms, mainly cooperatives, have been established. Cooperatives are especially strong on the Lower 48 West Coast.
Their combined arsenal of boats, boom, and skimming equipment has mushroomed in recent years.
The Spill Control Association of America, Detroit, says the U.S. has had an adequate inventory of near-shore spill cleanup equipment since the Santa Barbara Channel spill in February 1969. Response capability for far offshore spills has grown substantially since the Exxon Valdez spill.
MSRCs mission
MSRC has yet to combat a major spill, yet it has gone through some critical times since it was incorporated in 1990.
First was the challenge of creating the company from scratch, buying equipment, and training and hiring people. Just as it became fully operational, MSRC was forced to downsize. And now Coast Guard guideline changes are threatening its continued existence.
A group of companies, mostly international oil firms that ship oil into the U.S., formed the Marine Preservation Association (MPA), Scottsdale, Ariz., after the Exxon Valdez accident.
The companies fund MPA based on the volume of oil they import. MPA in turn funds the nonprofit MSRC, which so far has spent $400 million for equipment and $450 million for operating expenses.
Congress later enacted the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (OPA90), which required shippers of oil in coastal waters to have the capability to respond to major oil spills. MSRC provided that capability for its member companies.
It was designed to respond to spills from tankers, pipelines, platforms, and rigs off the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. provides the capability off Alaska.
MSRC is designed to combat a spill as large as 210,000 bblabout the size of the Exxon Valdez spillin any one region but says its degree of success will depend on weather, sea conditions, and other things.
As with any other spill responder, MSRC would clean up the spill to the satisfaction of the Coast Guard, which could assume overall control. The spiller would hire firefighting, lightering, and salvage services separately.
MSRC has positioned equipment at 22 sites along the U.S. coast (see map, OGJ, Dec. 28, 1992, p. 22). It responded to 10 small spills in 1994 and about eight in 1995.
The keystone of MSRCs spill response capability is sixteen 210 ft response vessels. They are similar to work boats used in the oil industry, but they have extra deck space to accommodate helicopters, boom, boom boats, and skimming systems. Each has oil/water separators and storage for 4,000 bbl of recovered oil.
Coast Guard guidelines
John Costello, MSRC president, said MSRC is threatened by pending Coast Guard guidelines that would allow for fairly broad interpretations of individual oil spill response organization (OSRO) capabilities.
Costello said, These are termed guidelines, but they have the effect of a rule. Some people say theyre doing a rulemaking process without going through the formalities that are required.
Theyve gotten widespread input into their decisionmaking process, so theyve met the essential elements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Theyre not acting arbitrarily, but they have not actually done a rulemaking. So, in substance, theyre complying. In form, theyre not.
The Coast Guard is expected to release the guidelines early this month, and they are expected to assume all OSROs can respond equally to a spill.
MSRC disagrees because it is the only OSRO with dedicated vessels on standby. Others have vessels that routinely do other jobs but would be used in case of a spill.
Costello said, The gut issue comes down to dedicated vs. nondedicated resources. Some oil spill cooperatives have certain aspects of their operations that are dedicated, but MSRC is the only fully dedicated organization. So it is more expensive to operate.
If the Coast Guard guidelines (which have the effect of regulations) credit the nondedicated response organization with the same capability as the dedicated one, theres no way the dedicated one is going to continue to exist.
He uses the analogy of a full time city fire department vs. a volunteer fire department: Both departments will put out the fire. Theres no argument about that. The question is which is going to put the fire out with the least damage.
Costello argues that MSRC can respond to a big spill faster and with more equipment than nondedicated organizations, and both factors are critical to containment of a spill in its early hours.
A large spill will demand response by dedicated and nondedicated units alike, Costello says.
We will need more resources than MSRC has. There absolutely is a role for these nondedicated organizations.
The issue is hurting MSRC. Its funding agency, MPA, has lost three majors: Sun, Citgo, and ARCO.
Costello said, Look at this situation from an oil companys point of view. They have put a lot of money into this organization. If it turns out that the Coast Guard isnt going to require it, why should they continue it?
He said if OSRO guidelines dont clearly differentiate between dedicated and nondedicated resources, MSRC as we know it today will have to change. My opinion is that would not be in the countrys best interest. We would have to go to nondedicated. Our equipment would not disappear. But instead of being there on the scene pumping oil off the water in 5-6 hr, we would be there much laterlike everybody else.
Equipment availability
The Coast Guard would require OSROs to be at the site of a spill in a high volume port within 12 hr and recover oil at a 10,000 b/d clip, rising to 20,000 b/d within 36 hr and 40,000 b/d within 60 hr.
In a low volume port or on the open sea, the volumes are the same but the response times are 24, 48, and 72 hr, respectively.
Costello argues that some small OSROs simply cant respond with enough equipment quickly enough to meet the 12 hr deadline.
You have to deliver a system consisting of devices to contain the oil, devices to remove the oil, and, most important, devices to store what you pick up. Temporary storage is the Achilles heel of this whole problem.
MSRC bought seventeen 40,000 bbl storage barges after its surveys found that barges are not available on the spot market within the times required.
The survey said the chances are youre not going to get a barge in less than 36 hr, and if you have to get it there in 12, our marketplace is not going to do it. The marketplace would be just fine for the second wave.
Also important are platforms for oil spill containment and removal equipment. MSRC ran exercises to see how long it would take in each high volume port to rent workboats, tugboats, and supply boats from the marketplace.
We found the equipment was doing something else. Theyre earning money by carrying pipe, towing barges, or fishing. We found it takes an appreciable amount of time to get our equipment installed, anywhere between 6-8 hours, on these boats.
Theyre not on a 2 hr recall like our ships are. So they may be available, or they may not, when you call. Theres going to be some time delay on the front end, then 6-8 hr to get the equipment married up, and then time to get it on the scene.
Costello said some small OSROs want the Coast Guard to level the playing field because they consider MSRC a monopoly.
How can we be a monopoly? We have been barely involved in only a few oil spills since the company was set up. I dont understand how we can be a monopoly when our revenues from oil spill response are virtually zip. But there are people out there making those accusations.
The small guys have gotten their piece of the action in the small spills. I think they feel that if the Coast Guard gets too rigorous in their definition, somehow theyre going to be rubbed out of the game. My opinion is that they wont be. They cant do much to respond in 12 hr. Theyre going to be needed in the second and third onslaughts, which is all they can do anyway.
The Coast Guards proposal would bring the nondedicated up to the level of assurance equivalent to the dedicated resources. The Coast Guard is saying that if they require a barge, and you dont have one, you have to have some sort of an arrangement with at least two barge operators that they would deliver a barge.
If our study is right, you can have 10 barge operators on the string and they arent going to be able to deliver a barge in less than 36 hr. I dont see how you can equate multiple contracts with reliability.
NRCs views
NRC owns 103 skimming units, 11 full time dedicated response vessels (including barges and skimming vessels), and 152,000 ft of boom.
It said its resources are enhanced by contracts with independent companies, giving it preferred access to 200 workboats, including 150 owned by its parent company, Seacor Holdings.
Steve Candito, vice-president of client services, said NRC is the worlds largest supplier of marine spill recovery services to independent shipowners and may be the largest in terms of equipment it owns and controls.
NRC serves businesses operating on the East Coast, Gulf Coast, and Caribbean. It will add coverage on the Lower 48 West Coast starting Mar. 1.
NRC argues that its marriage of dedicated and nondedicated equipment and personnel provides it a flexible resource base while maintaining cost effectiveness.
The company said, Our experience in more than 80 spills is that barges are easily obtained in areas that have high volume activity. Our commitments with barge owners involve more than casual arrangements.
These arrangements have been developed by tracking barge routes and taking into account the time involved in freeing up barges from normal operations.
NRC maintains dedicated storage vessels in smaller ports where barges are limited.
It argues, MSRCs limited number of prepositioned, dedicated vessels are insufficient (for large spills). Given a choice between a strategy of more equipment organized to move rapidly or a few dedicated vessels, NRC believes the former is sounder.
We have the best of both worlds: dedicated equipment where needed and access to a large resource base to supplement it.
Candito said NRC agrees with some of the things the Coast Guard is trying to achieve through its guidelines, especially making sure OSROs have equipment available.
Theyre also looking at more subjective things, which theyve termed a systems approach, which searches for the weakest link in your operations.
Candito said despite competition between spill cleanup companies, when the emergency happens, everybody puts that first and we all work together.
MSRC downsizes
Costello said his company, just like major oil companies that fund it, is under pressure to provide services for less cost.
After a 6 month program review and client study, which MPA assisted, MRSC downsized in mid 1995. The nationwide staff of 440 was cut 34% to 292, including a 60% cut in its Washington, D.C., headquarters staff.
Costello said MSRC will continue to maintain its core response capabilities to provide containment, recovery, and shoreline protection in its areas of responsibility. He said the downsizing did not affect any equipment or equipment operators.
Most of the cuts came through eliminating research and development and ending response management services MSRC had offered its 65 clients.
Costello said the survey of MPA members found they didnt want that service.
The Coast Guard expects spillers to have considerable capability to manage a cleanup. Costello said a cottage industry has arisen with some very skillful practitioners offering their services as spill management consultants.
MSRC reduced jobs in part by centralizing support services such as accounting, personnel, and human resources. In many locations, regional offices were closed and moved to space in warehouses where spill cleanup gear is stored.
And its training expenses have not been as high as expected. Most training was for employees of subcontractors who would be summoned to operate MSRC equipment in a spill. The retention rate of those trained employees was better than expected.
The companys operating budget will be about $59 million in 1996, down from $60 million in 1993 and $94 million in 1994.
It has invested more than $400 million in boats, barges, booms, and skimmers. Operating expenses were about $450 million in MSRCs first 5 years.
Research cut
Costello said OPA90 authorized federal funds for oil spill research, but little money was spent.
Because the federal government was expected to take over leadership of spill R&D, MPA member companies authorized an interim program.
Costello said to industrys credit, they continue to do what they said they would do. But to reduce expenses, MSRC had to phase out its R&D effective Dec. 31.
In its last R&D project, MSRC is funding a project with the Texas General Land Office.
The Coastal Oil Simulation System in Corpus Christi consists of nine 100 ft by 30-40 ft test tanks in which technicians can create a variety of shoreline situationsfor example, a rocky beach, a sandy beach, or a mangrove beach with vegetationand test the effectiveness of various methods of treating oil on beaches.
The system has devices to simulate waves and currents. It will enable tests of theories about cleaning up a shoreline. And the key question always is whether the cleanup methods do more harm than the spill.
Costello predicted burning will emerge as a major weapon for fighting spills, with dispersants and absorbents playing lesser roles.
He said, The body of scientific knowledge is suggesting that the harm to the environment (from burning) is not as bad as people thought. Youre turning water pollution into air pollution.
The scientific lesson from the Persian Gulf war was that the long term impact was very small. Burning is not the whole treatment. It is just another tool in the toolbox. It cant be effective everywhere, but in certain circumstances it is very good.
Other developments
MSRC has acquired equipment from the Marine Industry Resource Group (MIRG), a cooperative in the Gulf of Mexico. It included eight skimming systems and three fire boom systems.
It has placed in operation a $12 million shuttle barge system for cleanups in waters as shallow as 18 in. The 17 systems are trailer mounted and do not require wide-load permits. Some of the pontoons are self-propelled and push the others.
Costello said, They are positioned so we can get them to all the critical shallow waters in the requisite time. And we have to be able to move them long distances by truck.
I am proud of this capability. It was a solution to a very difficult problem. The traditional way to deal with oil in shallow water is to wait until it washes up on the shoreline and pick it up there. Thats giving away 80% of the game.
This allows us to get out on the water in a place like Galveston Bay, which has always been a thorn in the side of oil spill responders because you cant run normal boats in there.
Copyright 1996 Oil & Gas Journal. All Rights Reserved.
