David Knott
Senior Editor
The international tanker industry has made significant strides in improving the safety and environmental awareness of its operations in recent years.
When Exxon Corp.'s Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound on Mar. 24, 1989, more than 250,000 bbl of oil spilled into the water. The public outcry and political fallout that ensued spawned a shock wave that swept through the international oil industry.
With a string of mishaps following the Exxon Valdez spill, public scrutiny focused on the tanker industry and found it lacking. The U. S. government reacted strongly with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), causing a second shock wave.
OPA 90 defied worldwide thinking on tanker safety. It set narrow requirements for tanker construction, forced the creation of a national spill response program, and made tanker operators solely liable for spill damage.
While the industry was debating the rights and wrongs of these three rulings, two bigger tanker spills hit Europe last year. The Aegean Sea and Braer accidents around the end of last year forced the pace of European legislation.
Since then global initiatives have been announced to improve design and maintenance of tankers and take steps toward eliminating substandard ships and operators.
PRIORITIES
"Safety and environmental protection from oil spills have to be the industry's highest priorities," said Gerhard Kurz, chairman of Oil Companies International Marine Forum (Ocimf) and president of Mobil Shipping & Transportation Co.
"Much has happened since Exxon Valdez, and OPA 90 has made sure that our industry will never be the same again. Despite some unfortunate accidents earlier this year, we do have a more safety conscious industry today."
Measures taken include tougher standards set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), classification societies, insurance underwriters, and port and flag state authorities, said Kurz. Also, intensive vessel inspections by major oil companies are contributing to safety.
"The concern for safety is not ignored by the market," said Kurz. "There is a clear and growing preference for quality tonnage including modern vessels and well maintained older units operated by reputable companies.
"Good ships are seeing steadier employment, and bad ships are sitting around a lot more. We are also beginning to see occasional rate spurts, not because there are not enough ships around, but because quality considerations make a growing number of ships no longer acceptable."
Kurz said that the industry already has an extensive and comprehensive set of rules and regulations governing tanker operations.
"What is lacking is the enforcement of uniform standards across the industry. This is the one surefire way to guarantee that only acceptable tankers are available for charter. Unfortunately, this is still only a goal, not a reality."
This month Ocimf plans to begin circulating members' inspection reports on tankers (see story, p. 23). This is designed to help provide critical vessel data prior to award of a charter.
"While this type of information is helpful, in the final analysis it is no substitute for the regulatory role to be performed by government authorities and classification societies," said Kurz.
"Let's face it: until a class certificate is once again reliable evidence of a vessel's quality and proper maintenance, there will always be a degree of distrust and skepticism between owners and charterers."
TANKER DESIGN
OPA 90 requires all new tankers ordered after June 1990 and destined to call at U.S. ports to have double hulls. By 2015 this ruling will be extended to all tankers calling at U.S. ports.
This ruling stirred controversy about whether the double hull design is the safest. Some sectors of the industry argue that buoyancy of a double hull tanker is reduced when it is damaged. Also, there would be a risk of fires and explosions caused by hydrocarbon vapor collecting in spaces between the hulls.
One of the chief critics of OPA's double hull ruling is Bill Gray, president of Skaarup Oil Corp., Greenwich, Conn.
Gray told tanker owners and operators recently, "You all know what a double hull tanker looks like. The 535 naval architects in the U.S. Congress 3 years ago did also and therefore adopted it unanimously."
Gray favors the middeck design, in which cargo above the middeck is protected from any credible accident barring a military air strike.
"Cargo below the middeck is protected by physics: if a hole is punched in the bottom, the greater hydrostatic pressure outside the ship will force the oil into the ship rather than allowing it to run out."
Three major studies on tanker design since Exxon Valdez have concentrated on pollution prevention, said Gray, with special emphasis on grounding and collisions.
These were the National Academy of Sciences tanker design study, the IMO oil tanker design study, which compared middeck with double hull designs, and the Herbert Engineering Corp. study commissioned by the U.S. Coast Guard.
"Based on all of these, the Coast Guard, as mandated by OPA 90, recommended to Congress in December 1992 that it only allow newbuilding double hull tankers, not the middeck as had been agreed at IMO," said Gray.
"Why was it that the marine experts of the world at IMO voted unanimously, with the exception of the U.S., to allow the middeck and equivalent designs, not just double hulls?"
Gray said no other current designs give the same level of performance as double hull and middeck tankers, though neither is perfect.
"Many in the world, myself included, believe alternative designs deserve continuing attention, so that eventually something better than simply double hulls will emerge."
In the meantime, American Bureau of Shipping has developed a software package to enable designers, builders, and users of tankers to improve vessel designs and streamline repair and maintenance programs (see story, p. 25).
TANKER FLEET
Kurz said by the end of next year 120 very large crude carrier newbuilds will have been added to the world fleet in 5 years, amounting to 25% of the existing fleet.
"Compare this with less than 50 vessels scrapped and you have the answer to the market's demise," said Kurz.
"I am pleased by the influx of this new tonnage. It expands the pool of quality vessels available in the market. By the same token, I am discouraged that more ships of substandard quality have not been scrapped.
"Not only would more scrapping help to upgrade the overall quality of the industry fleet, it would also help alleviate the prevailing tanker capacity surplus, which is the root cause of the industry's economic problems."
A 1993 European Commission (EC) report into shipping safety saw some correlation between age of vessels and reduced safety. Twenty-nine percent of the world's oil tanker fleet was said to be more than 20 years old in 1991.
However, said the EC, "Age itself need not be a major problem if a vessel is built, operated, and maintained in accordance with international standards".
The EC said the poor safety record of aging vessels calls into question the performance of the companies operating them. Loading and unloading techniques drew fire. So did failure of some flag states to ensure compliance of vessels with international construction, operation, and maintenance standards.
"Give me a well maintained older vessel, with an experienced and motivated crew trained in safe operating procedures, and I will take that ship any day of the week over a brand new tanker, no matter what its design, if its operation is dependent on an inexperienced or incompetent crew," said Kurz.
"There are more than a few recently built ships that leave a lot to be desired, both from a structural and performance point of view. Conversely, many mid-1970s built ships, because of their heavy scantlings, generally solid construction, and sound maintenance, are as safe and dependable as many of today's younger ships."
OPA STATUS
Rear Adm. Gene Henn, chief of marine safety, security and environmental protection, U.S. Coast Guard, said 14 OPA regulations have been implemented, including one rule requiring tankers sailing in U.S. waters to have double hulls and two rules setting out requirements for vessel response plans.
"They are the rules that have the most significant impact on tanker design and operation," said Henn. "These also were major projects that took an extraordinary amount of effort to complete."
Henn said much work on 33 remaining regulations has been completed. He expected publication of rules to be largely complete by the middle of next summer.
"The only remaining major rule is the existing single hull project," said Henn. "Existing single hull tank vessels will be able to remain in service until 2015 only if they meet new structural and operational requirements. A proposed rulemaking defining those requirements has been drafted and will be on the street soon."
SPILL RESPONSE
OPA 90 became law Aug. 18, said David Usher, president of oil spill cleanup contractor Marine Pollution Control, Detroit. This was a short test period, but enough to show the long term value of OPA.
By October, more than 1,600 vessel response plans had been submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard for review, covering 5,800 vessels worldwide. Also, 88 contractors had applied to the Coast Guard for classification as oil spill response organizations, for which they need to demonstrate adequate standards.
"While Coast Guard approval is not required, it testifies to professionalism," said Usher. "The Coast Guard has given interim classifications to 70 contractors and final approval to 20. In addition, the Coast Guard has visited and inspected 200 sites."
Rear Adm. Henn said, "Despite our best efforts at prevention, it is inevitable that some oil will be spilled."
The response plan requirements of OPA 90 deal with the need for planning clean up operations before a spill occurs. This will be done through the national Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP). The PREP guidance document is currently under development and is expected to be published this month. Implementation date for PREP is Jan. 1, 1994.
Henn said large spills can overwhelm local response capability and require special planning. Such spills, dubbed "spills of national significance," are the subject of a plan under development, which will identify in detail the roles of federal, state. local and private responders.
TAMPA BAY SPILL
In response to a recent 51000 bbl oil spill in Tampa Bay, Fla., resulting from a collision between a freighter and two products barges (OGJ, Aug. 23, p. 17), Usher said 18 contractors used 1,600 people at peak in the cleanup.
Equipment called out included 11 portable barges, 26 skid mounted vacuum transfer units, 18 skimmers, six rope mops, 86,000 ft of boom, 7,500 ft of inflatable offshore boom, a 16,000 bbl barge and mobile communications center, four vacuum trucks, more than 50 dump trucks, one helicopter, 19 pressure washers and more than 50 boats.
Usher said this response would not have been possible without OPA 90, with transporters, insurers, spill cooperatives and state and federal agencies working together to limit overall costs of the spill.
"On the negative side, the Coast Guard used its resources too long in offloading the barge," said Usher. While he admired the Coast Guard's "Shoot first, ask questions later" approach to spill response, Usher said this should not be at the expense of the private sector, which had been paid for by the tanker industry.
SPILL LIABILITY
Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., London, said the tanker industry has largely accepted the double hull implementation set out in OPA 90 but universally condemns the principle of unlimited liability for spills borne by shipowners and operators.
"One prominent shipowner has already described the trading of tankers to the U.S. as like a game of Russian roulette," said Drewry. "Some have simply stopped trading in black oils to U.S. ports in their own ships, while others are relying solely on chartering."
By introducing unlimited liability in U.S waters, Drewry argued that U.S. authorities are in danger of creating a self-imposed oil embargo at a time when the country's dependence on oil imports is growing.
"The old principle of sharing responsibility for the transportation between cargo owner and shipping company is not included in OPA to the detriment of the environment," said Andreas Ugland, chairman of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), Oslo (OGJ, Oct. 4, p. 42).
"This significantly reduces the incentive for charterers to choose the best operator and the best ship. This should be changed."
Intertanko and the U.S. Coast Guard reached agreement over independent operators' problems in securing oil spill response coverage on the U.S. West Coast.
Intertanko members holding contracts with National Response Corp, New York, were told NRC could not provide a West Coast service. They feared they may have to duplicate East Coast coverage currently in place in order to provide full U.S. response (OGJ, July 26, p. 32).
A meeting between Intertanko and the Coast Guard in late July resulted in a compromise. Intertanko members' vessels would stay more than 60 miles from the U.S. West Coast until they were entering port, and this they would do directly.
Oil spill coverage contracts for individual ports could then be agreed by members with local spill collectives on the West Coast.
EUROPEAN SPILLS
EC was already in discussion with IMO over tighter guidelines for tankers when two accidents in Europe bounced oil pollution back into the news.
On Dec. 3, 1992, the Aegean Sea tanker ran aground off Northwest Spain, spilling 490,000 bbl of crude oil. The vessel was trying to enter La Coruna harbor in heavy seas (OGJ, Dec. 14, 1992, p. 24).
On Jan. 5, the Braer tanker ran aground off the Shetland Islands. More than 600,000 bbl of crude oil entered the sea in 3 weeks. The vessel had lost power in bad weather and drifted onto rocks (OGJ, Jan. 11, p. 26).
Regarding main causes of casualties, EC concluded, "Existing international standards are for the most part an adequate framework, and therefore the continuing high le -el of risk of casualties in the shipping industry is not primarily determined by the absence of adequate international rules but rather a laxity in their application and enforcement."
Two main factors in shipping losses were identified: human error and unsatisfactory performance by a number of shipping operators and authorities responsible for safety in their flag states.
Human error was seen as a contributory cause in most cases giving rise to claims following an accident. It accounted for almost 60% of major claims and 80% of incidents reported in insurers' statistics, EC said.
EC LEGISLATION
EC legislation on tankers is not possible before December, when ministers next meet to discuss the current proposals. An EC official said timing of new legislation is uncertain because ministers must agree on proposed rules before they could be implemented in an EC directive. This means they still could be discussing proposals at their December 1994 meeting.
Measures under discussion are designed to eliminate substandard operators, vessels, and crews from EC waters, irrespective of which flag they sail under.
"The main problem, given the universal regulatory approach in shipping, stems from the striking variation in the level of safety performance among fleets, including member states' fleets," says the draft proposal.
Variations are due to the different levels at which countries, including EC members, adopt and enforce international standards, says the report.
"Individual action by member states has not produced adequate results in the past and is unlikely to do so in the future. The European Community, thanks to its political and legislative machinery, is uniquely placed both to ensure that member states apply standards to ships flying their flags in a more uniform and rigorous manner and to enforce, with common methods and rigor, respect of the same standards on vessels of all flags when operating in EC waters."
EC says its action program is based on a coherent package of measures, including:
- Uniform implementation of international rules across the EC.
- Tighter governmental control of ships at EC ports, with uniform enforcement of international rules to ships of all flags.
- Harmonized development of navigational aids and traffic surveillance, particularly in environmentally sensitive areas.
- Help for international organizations in strengthening standards.
"Equally important are measures to improve training and qualification of crew so as to address the problem of human error, which remains the main cause of accidents," says the draft directive. "An intensive and reoriented research program could contribute to the overall goal of enhancing maritime safety."
DONALDSON INQUIRY
After the Braer spill, the U.K. Department of Transport (DOT) set up a public inquiry into the accident's cause, headed by Lord Donaldson.
A DOT official said the report on the inquiry's findings is not expected until the end of this year or early next year. Public hearings are finished, and the inquiry team remains "closeted away writing its report".
At the same time DOT is carrying out an investigation into the causes of the Braer accident. A first draft has been written, but the final report will be published at about the same time as the Donaldson report.
Among many submissions to the Donaldson inquiry, oil companies and independent tanker owners were invited to offer their views.
Oil companies are now making arrangements to obtain access to each other's ship inspection reports, British Petroleum Co. plc told the inquiry. Also, the International Association of Classification Societies had introduced measures to increase the frequency of inspection of older tankers.
"Many recent international incidents have been because of a failure both to police standards and to carry out laid-down procedures," said BP. "The failure to enforce existing regulations, a shortage of well trained officers and crews, and poor maintenance are all fundamental to this problem."
BP emphasized that errors by ships' officers and crew were the root cause of most accidents, since their reaction to any accident would in most cases determine whether the result was major pollution.
"Of course quality of the world tanker fleet is a factor," said BP, "Oil company majors have strived to maintain the standards of the ships they own, and have exercised quality control on the ships they use.
"But the oil majors account for less than a quarter of the cargoes moved. There are, moreover, obvious difficulties in assessing the quality of over 3,000 ships trading internationally."
BP said major spills represent only one eighth of the annual input of oil into the world's oceans and are not the entire problem, despite causing the greatest public concern.
Copyright 1993 Oil & Gas Journal. All Rights Reserved.
