NTSB: THERE'S EXXON VALDEZ BLAME FOR ALL

The National Transportation Safety Board has faulted all parties involved with the Exxon Valdez grounding and oil spill.

The board, after a 16 month inquiry into the largest, costliest accident it has investigated, offered no new explanations for the accident other than to emphasize that the tanker crew was overworked.

NTSB ruled the probable cause of the Mar. 24, 1989, accident off Alaska was the fatigued third mate's failure to maneuver the vessel, the captain's failure to provide a proper navigation watch due to his alcohol impairment, Exxon's failure to provide a fit captain and rested and sufficient crew, the Coast Guard's failure to maintain an effective Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) control system, and the lack of effective pilot services.

NTSB made many recommendations-which are not binding-to Exxon Shipping Co., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., and federal and state agencies.

It considered recommending that the Coast Guard require double hulls for all tankers but decided that the facts of the case would not warrant such action.

NTSB'S FINDINGS

NTSB spelled out these circumstances surrounding the accident:

Two officers were needed to navigate the Exxon Valdez between an ice field and Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, one of them handling the vessel and the other fixing its position frequently.

But Capt. Joseph Hazlewood's judgment was impaired by alcohol, and he improperly left the third mate in charge, also a violation of Exxon and Coast Guard rules.

NTSB investigators assembled data from which they concluded Hazlewood drank alcohol while on board the ship and was drunk.

Performance of the third mate was "deficient," probably because of fatigue. He failed to turn the vessel at the proper time and with sufficient rudder.

There were no rested deck officers on the Exxon Valdez available to stand the navigation watch when the vessel departed from the Alyeska terminal.

An NTSB investigator explained that deck officers do their hardest work in port, and they are tired when they take their ships to sea.

Exxon has incentives and work requirements that could cause fatigue and had "manipulated" shipboard reporting of equipment maintenance and crew overtime information it submitted to the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard had approved a smaller crew for Exxon Valdez mainly on the assumption that shipboard hardware and equipment might reduce the workload at sea, but the Coast Guard did not consider the heavier workload in port.

CLEANUP, PREVENTION

What's more, the board said:

Alyeska should have had a second barge loaded with additional cleanup and lightering equipment ready for immediate deployment.

Cleanup plans lacked adequate guidance on the use of dispersants and burning of oil under various conditions. Required conferences unnecessarily delayed the use of those cleanup methods.

There is no evidence that the federal government or any other organization would have been capable of increasing cleanup efforts under way during the first 24 hr after the spill.

Although Exxon Valdez met all U.S. and international segregated ballast regulations, present standards for segregated ballast and cargo tank size do not provide adequate protection against oil spills caused by groundings or collisions.

If Exxon Valdez had been fitted with an 11 ft deep double bottom, the resulting oil spill would have been small-possibly eliminated.

Double bottoms on all U.S. and foreign tankers that enter U.S. waters and have a capacity of more than 20,000 dwt would minimize oil spills caused by groundings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Among its recommendations, NTSB urged Exxon to:

Eliminate personnel policies "that encourage marine employees to work long hours without concern for debilitating fatigue and commensurate reduction in safety."
Improve its alcohol/drug program for seagoing employees, with emphasis on recognition of recidivism after treatment.

In addition, NTSB said, the Guard should:

Enforce rules requiring officers on watch during departures from ports to have had at least 6 hr of off duty time in the previous 12 hr.
Improve its Prince William Sound VTS and install an additional radar site near Bligh Reef.
Require two licensed officers on the decks of ships.

And the Environmental Protection Agency and Alaska should facilitate the use of dispersants and burning of oil following accidents.

NTSB also suggested a number of ways Alyeska could improve its oil spill preparedness.