US and the Middle East

June 17, 2013
Of all the mistakes the US can make about an especially turbulent Middle East, one should be especially easy to describe and avoid.

Of all the mistakes the US can make about an especially turbulent Middle East, one should be especially easy to describe and avoid. The mistake is to assume that a surge in production of oil and gas from unconventional resources in North America means the US has diminishing reason to worry about Middle Eastern affairs.

Falling into that trap would be easy. The US has had troops fighting and dying in Iraq or Afghanistan or both at the same time for most of the past two decades. The effort mostly has created local resentment. Americans are tired of the sacrifice and cynical response. The fatigue is one reason the administration of Barack Obama has implemented a so-called pivot of American attention, military and otherwise, away from the Middle East and toward Asia. Other reasons support the shift. Large among them, though hardly alone, is China's rapid rise to global economic leadership.

Unusually messy

The Middle East is unusually messy at the moment. Arab Spring countries seem to have thrown out old despots only to make room in high office for Islamist radicals. Civil war ravages Syria. Protests threaten Turkish stability. Iran taunts the world with nuclear aspirations while maneuvering to expand Shi'a influence in Syria, Bahrain, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Although oil powerhouses such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates loathe the prospect of a nuclear Iran, they hedge their resistance to be safe. Newly democratic Iraq, meanwhile, remains volatile and dangerous—except in the Kurdish north.

Given the difficulties facing further involvement in the region, the US has excellent reason to proceed cautiously. But it can't pretend the Middle East no longer matters.

The Middle East will continue to dominate global oil supply. It will continue to represent the single largest influence on oil prices. No country that uses oil or engages in trade can insulate itself from the effects of oil-supply disruptions in the Middle East, no matter how much oil or renewable energy it produces of its own and no matter how much or little it imports. What happens in the Middle East thus will remain especially important to the world's largest single consumer of oil.

In the US, worry about what happens in the Middle East now should be especially high. The worst-case scenario is dreadful and hardly out of the question. Syria could degenerate into a killing zone of warring factions, with the Bashar al-Assad remaining in power but controlling only Damascus, brutalizing other parts of the country with military incursions and dependent on Iran. Sectarian conflict could spread to Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey, strengthening Iranian influence though Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shi'a majority of Iraq. Agitation for Kurdish independence might grow in Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. Boundaries established after World War I would come under pressure. Sectarian power struggles could flare in the big Sunni-dominated oil producers. Supply disruptions—political and physical—would rock markets with increasing frequency.

But the worst-case scenario isn't the likeliest one. Syria's nightmare might yet end with Assad gone and democracy catching hold. Turkey's demonstrations might prove to have been transitory. Savvy outsiders might find ways to leverage the real reluctance of Shi'a populations in Iraq and Bahrain harbor to submit to Iranian hegemony.

Theocratic experiments

Islamist ascendancy in Arab Spring countries, moreover, doesn't necessarily have the permanent implications ascribed to it in Western populations given to snap judgments. All democratic transitions have their fits and starts. In countries where Islam was law under newly ousted sovereigns, experiments with theocratic democracy should not be surprising. Where those experiments lead remains to be seen.

Outsiders can't control outcomes in the Middle East. But they can shape events and should do so when the influence promotes democracy and peace. What's essential is to stay constructively engaged. New domestic oil supply gives the US no reason to shirk this responsibility or to think doing so serves its interests.