New directions in federal pipeline safety program promote continuous improvement

Jan. 10, 2005
The new regulatory direction being taken by the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Research and Special Programs Administration of the US Department of Transportation has important implications for the inspections process, pipeline operators, and the OPS.

The new regulatory direction being taken by the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Research and Special Programs Administration of the US Department of Transportation has important implications for the inspections process, pipeline operators, and the OPS.

Understanding this new direction and its implications will take time and patience on everyone's part. Based on the early evidence, however, we are confident that this new approach will allow operators to develop effective and efficient programs, promote continuous improvement throughout the industry, and lead to better performance.

OPS is committed to improving safety, reliability, and public confidence in the US pipeline infrastructure; pipelines safely deliver more than two thirds of the nation's energy.

But the challenge in maintaining that safety record is evolving. Increased suburban development in parts of the US means more people are living—and more construction companies are operating—closer to pipelines than ever before. This means pipeline accidents, although infrequent, are more likely to have tragic consequences. In addition, a small number of pipeline accidents during the past several years have generated significant media interest. This is why we have made dramatic improvements in ensuring the safety of pipeline operations nationwide.

OPS started in 1994 by convening a Pipeline Safety Summit, where we brought together a wide range of public, local government, and environmental groups to discuss new ideas and potential new paths. From this summit, we developed a new strategy designed to ensure the safety of the nation's pipeline infrastructure. Known as the Risk Management Demonstration Program, the plan committed the pipeline community to establishing a multiyear process for incorporating risk management principles into pipeline operations and the federal pipeline safety program.

This new plan was an important first step. We also realized we needed to establish a fundamental set of prescriptive requirements that would apply to all operators. For example, one thing that was missing in many operator risk management programs was an aggressive and comprehensive approach to investigating pipeline threats. This approach must include a good and current understanding of the condition of the pipeline itself, and an integrated consideration of all available information on the factors that could affect the integrity of the line.

We also learned important lessons after an accident in Bellingham, Wash., where deficiencies in an operator's safety program contributed to a loss of life. We learned that our approach must balance the competing demands of flexible management practices that produce pipeline-specific programs, customized and optimized to individual systems, with more-rigid prescribed practices that ensure all operators have a full and up-to-date understanding of the threats to their systems and are effectively dealing with them.

What evolved from these realizations is what is today referred to as integrity management (IM). IM is an approach that combines periodic inspection and testing of the pipeline's condition with continuous management processes to collect, integrate, analyze, and apply information about the threats to the pipeline.

IM is integrated in several new rules that OPS has issued, and it will guide our thinking as we continue to work to improve the safety of the nation's pipeline network.

Initiatives to revitalize regulation

New rules include the hazardous liquid integrity management rules for large and small operators, the operator qualification rule, and the gas integrity management rule.

These rules are designed to allow operators flexibility, while insisting on the highest safety standards possible. Operators need flexibility because pipeline designs and operating environments vary widely. We understand that a one-size fits all approach will not work in the pipeline industry, which is exactly why our focus is on results instead of prescribing specific methods.

Some have incorrectly labeled these new rules as "performance-based," implying that quantitative performance objectives are stipulated and operators are allowed a high degree of flexibility in how to attain and measure their attainment of regulatory objectives.

Performance-based rules do not apply as well to the pipeline industry because we are dealing with the prevention of incidents that occur, statistically speaking, very infrequently. In addition, sometimes it can take years between taking a safety action and seeing the effects of that action.

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The approach that OPS uses includes performance-based elements, but is better characterized as "management based" because it requires operators to build programs that explicitly include the need for several management practices.

While the new rules allow a level of flexibility for operators to choose the management practices that work best for them, the rules also prescribe a range of specific "auditable" requirements.

One management-based provision is the requirement that operators build a risk-assessment process and, among other things, establish pipeline assessment priorities.

The terms "pipeline assessment," "baseline assessment," and "pipeline integrity assessment" are used here and in the IM rules to mean application of in-line inspection, pressure testing, direct assessment, or an alternative inspection technology.

Another example is the requirement to integrate data from various sources, including pipeline integrity assessments, to help identify potentially hazardous conditions that might not be evident from a single source of data.

The processes used for inspecting against provisions of a management-based rule are necessarily different from those used for inspecting for compliance with a purely prescriptive rule. A management-based rule provides flexibility in how operators evaluate, justify, and change their practices to satisfy the intent of the rule within their unique operating environment.

A purely prescriptive rule involves more black-and-white observations of compliance. These differences have important implications to the preparation necessary by both the inspector and the operator.

The kinds of management changes we are requiring are designed to lead to improved performance; however, in most cases the results will not appear immediately. The ultimate proof of the effectiveness of operator programs will be apparent in performance trends.

More timely feedback is required to demonstrate the effectiveness of operator programs. That is why, when we look at how an operator is implementing the new rules, we evaluate how well they are complying with the rule's prescriptive provisions and whether they have created an effective approach that will truly improve pipeline safety.

New approach to inspection, enforcement

OPS has adopted several mechanisms to support how we evaluate these new rules and how well operators are implementing them. These mechanisms are designed to promote conformance with several guiding principles, including assuring that the OPS will:

  • Conduct complete inspections that are closely aligned with requirements stated in the rule.
  • Strive to inspect and enforce these requirements consistently and in a timely manner.
  • Assure stability of the regulatory process in a way that allows incorporation of lessons from ongoing studies, new R&D, and industry experience.
  • Ensure that the rule and related activities lead to appropriate increases in regulatory and public confidence in pipeline integrity.

One of the historic problems encountered with the use of management-based rules is the potential for ambiguity of acceptance criteria. Operators are sometimes concerned that different inspectors will draw different conclusions because the acceptance criteria are not clear. That is exactly why we developed mechanisms that clearly establish and communicate a common set of expectations between regulators and operators of what constitutes an acceptable program.

The mechanisms include:

  • Developing inspection protocols.
  • Providing detailed guidance to inspectors.
  • Assembling and answering "frequently asked questions."
  • Training and evaluating inspectors.

The first mechanism, inspection protocols, is designed to improve the communication of regulatory expectations with states and the industry; support improved consistency of inspections conducted by various regulatory groups; and provide assurance of the stability of the acceptance criteria associated with the rules.

The protocols developed are simply questions that support structured exploration during the inspection of how each operator meets provisions of the rules.

In addition to inspection protocols, we also developed detailed inspection guidance for field inspectors to help assure consistent reviews for all operators. The protocols and inspection guidance go beyond checklist approaches to support development of an integrated understanding of an operator's program.

A relatively simple mechanism that we find quite effective is posting an extensive set of frequently asked questions and answers on our web site, http://primis.rspa.dot.gov/iim/

faqs.htm. As simple as it may seem, these questions and answers provide a major source of practical information to operators about the various provisions in the rule.

We are also working to help break down misunderstandings about our regulations within the pipeline community. As part of that effort, OPS is conducting a series of public workshops designed to generate conversations about our rules. We want to provide everyone with a chance to better understand what we're trying to accomplish and the challenges the pipeline community faces as it puts in place the new safety programs.

These mechanisms give us a good process for measuring how well the pipeline community is working to improve safety. But it is just as important for operators to create ways so they can measure their own improvements.

That is why our IM rule includes requirements for operators to develop their own performance measures and performance monitoring programs. These requirements are important because operators must have a way to benchmark their successes and evaluate what work still needs to be done.

Good management procedures require time to develop, document, and fully implement. Accordingly, our initial inspections have focused on evaluating compliance with prescriptive provisions of the rule. We need an effective measure, however, for assuring that operators understand what is expected of them.

We must have a way to be certain operators are on track to meet our expectations for safety and performance in a reasonable amount of time. That is why our regulators are looking for any gaps that might exist in safety programs and what plans are in place to ensure future improvements for the coming months and years.

This evidence could take the form of a plan or other approach that both describes the approaches the operator is taking to satisfy regulatory expectations, and clarifies the time frame in which these actions will be completed.

Implications for regulatory compliance

We have created several types of monitoring to assure that the US pipeline infrastructure is operated in compliance with regulations and in the interest of the public. The monitoring we have created assesses three things:

  • Condition of the pipeline and support equipment.
  • Qualification of the people who operate and maintain the pipeline and support equipment.
  • Effectiveness of the management systems and processes used to direct and control operation and maintenance.

Ultimately, operators that have effectively addressed these three areas should expect to see improved performance over the short and long-term.

We have also worked to strengthen regulations governing the qualification of the people, processes, and systems needed to support the IM efforts. These changes should lead to future improvements in performance. However, while operators are working to meet the new guidelines, the OPS will focus on evaluating the adequacy of the new processes themselves. We cannot simply wait for the expected improvements in performance; we must know that operators are taking steps today to meet these tough new guidelines.

Not only are we improving safety regulations, we are working to improve our overall approach to inspection and enforcement. As we go about this work, we're asking a number of tough questions about the way we do business:

  • Do we have enough inspectors to provide adequate oversight?
  • Do inspectors have the right mix of skills to get the job done?
  • Do we have the right process and the right information to support inspections and enforcement actions?

Currently, the OPS has three types of inspections: operations and management inspections (performed either regionally or system-wide), systems or process inspections (e.g., IM), and field investigations and monitoring (accident investigations and new construction oversight).

As the pipeline community and our mission continue to evolve, we are challenging ourselves to find the best way to make sure our inspections continue to be relevant and effective.

As a result, we are considering a number of changes to the way we conduct inspections, including:

  • Enhancing current processes for gathering incident and accident cause information, and evaluating implications for individual operators.
  • Strengthening existing processes for documenting and monitoring completion of commitments.
  • Improving documentation and communication processes for results from field inspections.
  • Designing mechanisms to assemble, evaluate, and monitor operator performance results and commitments.
  • Integrating results from multiple sources to identify operator-specific "areas of focus" or "areas of concern" to be addressed in inspections.
  • Developing new approaches to identify and focus attention on poor performing, intransigent, and "stressed" (e.g., organizational or economic change) operators.

In addition, we are working with our state partners to make sure they have the latest information and technology they need to make accurate evaluations. That is why we are:

  • Increasing understanding of and participation in national consensus standards.
  • Expanding engagement of stakeholders to ensure interpretations support the attainment of rule objectives.
  • Obtaining access to experts to prepare studies to support clarification of accepted practices.
  • Expanding access to R&D to support needed development, demonstration, and deployment of technologies.

As we pursue these and other improvements, OPS will convene a series of public meetings to gather feedback on the best ways to develop these practices.

Implications for industry practice

Our new regulatory approach has some important implications for pipeline operators. In addition to satisfying the new requirements of the rules themselves, successful operators must show that they:

  • Will be prepared to justify and document (not just describe) their IM programs and approaches. We are not just interested in "what" approach an operator takes to achieve the regulatory objective, but "why" the operator decided to take that approach.

In order to evaluate the appropriateness of the approach, we expect the operator to be able to describe the basis for its approach. There are many different acceptable approaches to satisfying the management requirements of the new rules. The operator will be deemed compliant as long as the operator can clearly describe why its approach meets the intent of the regulation and is appropriate for their situation.

  • Have ample documentation of their approach and results. OPS is not interested in "paper programs" requiring excess documentation. An operator must demonstrate that its programs and approaches will be understood by its employees and be continually and consistently implemented within its organizations. This requires documented descriptions of its programs, and internal policies and procedures assuring the implementation of these programs.
  • Take responsibility for "mapping" of its program to the rule requirements, not expecting our inspectors to make the connections themselves between sections of the rule and elements of the operator's program.
  • Share knowledge and experience across the industry. IM involves an investigative approach to problem identification and a flexible approach to solution. The investigative problem identification approach must look beyond the boundaries of any one company and examine all relevant experience from all operators. The flexible solution identification approach must account for accepted industry practices and the practical experiences of other operators in implementing these practices.
  • Demonstrate a commitment to continuous improvement. One of the inherent benefits of a flexible "management process" approach to regulation is the ability to incorporate new technologies, data, and knowledge as they are developed. Of course, we recognize the significant resource commitment that many operators have already made and the concerns about the additional resources that may be required to deal with the standards and criteria that continue to be developed.

It is in everyone's best interest to ensure a stable regulatory environment. Such an environment must, however, address new issues as they are recognized or knowledge as it is developed. The most successful operator programs will allow, or even promote, recognition and implementation of better ways to achieve shared objectives.

The author

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Stacey Gerard is the associate administrator for pipeline safety in the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Pipeline Safety Program. She has served in this program since 1992, and previously served as director of both the Office of Policy, Regulations and Training and the Office of Program Development. Gerard is responsible for all aspects of the Pipeline Safety Program, including regulatory and standards-setting activities, compliance and enforcement programs, and program development and budget execution. Her recent efforts have focused on the integrity management program and damage prevention, risk management, mapping, and environmental programs. Prior to joining the Pipeline Safety Program, she served in the department's Office of Policy and Program Support and the Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation. Gerard has over 20 years of government experience in nuclear, chemical, and emergency planning and 10 years of experience in private industry management consulting, with emphasis in the energy field. She holds a BA and MA in english from Simmons College, Boston.