Iraqi reservoir mismanagement
From a reservoir management point of view, it is saddening to read Sam Fletcher's report (Feb. 16, 2004, p. 24) about what Mr. Issam Al-Chalabi, Iraq former oil minister, had to say regarding the Iraqi reservoir mismanagement, at the Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) Annual Energy Conference in Houston, February 2004.
Reservoir mismanagement practices have been affecting Iraqi oil production since the days of the British Mandate, the reign of King Faisal, and the early part of the revolution, because the oil industry was in the dark ages itself with respect to this technology.
In the late 1970s, reservoir management was introduced to the oil industry, but Iraq was too preoccupied at that time with its war with Iran (in the 1980s) to take advantage of that technology. During the 1990s, reservoir management principles advanced and became available for implementation throughout the oil industry, but the UN failed to introduce and implement reservoir management principles to Iraq, which I believe may have caused Iraq to suffer a major loss of its national wealth due to over a decade of sanctions. I believe the UN should be responsible to compensate the Iraqis for its misdeeds.
Mr. Al-Chalabi's criticism of matching or surpassing Iraq's prewar oil production level is appropriate; however, I am intrigued by his call for an Iraqi oil production cap of 2 million b/d without any reservoir management plans for existing oil and gas field redevelopment, and possibly for future needed field development.
Rather than forgetting about searching for Saddam's misdeeds, as Al-Chalabi suggested, it is highly recommended that the Iraqi Governing Council and the oil ministry staff include with the above efforts the identification of all the reservoir mismanagement practices and the quantification of the amount of damages that each reservoir has suffered.
This undertaking will be a precursor to any future reservoir management studies and plans of the Iraqi oil and gas fields. However, I believe that the Governing Council should be held responsible and stand accountable for any future Iraqi reservoir mismanagement, if it fails to stipulate in the new Iraqi constitution that reservoir management principles should be religiously observed by all Iraqis and future foreign operating companies. Otherwise, severe penalties should be imposed on the violators along with predetermined compensation to the Iraqi government.
Al-Chalabi should be reminded that the US was so kind to come to the rescue of the Iraqis using its taxpayer's monies to free Iraq from Saddam's grip. Therefore, blaming the US for not having reservoir management plans for the postwar occupation is inappropriate. Certainly, there are major differences between the US and Iraqi agendas.
From what we note in the news, US objectives and plans are clear and obvious. They include the destruction of terrorism and the spread American democracy in Iraq and the Middle East.
The US's plans to repair and restore oil production surface facilities before reservoir reevaluation and its treatment—along with the study of the economical productivities over the short and long terms—are, in my opinion, counter productive to reservoir management principles. However, I believe that if such attempts were to be implemented, they may turn out later on to be reservoir mismanagement themselves.
It is sad to learn that severe reservoir mismanagement has been caused by the operational misdeeds due to overproducing and reinjecting various products, including hydrocarbon wastes, into the oil reservoirs. Although, these misdeeds were the results of political desires, as reported by Al-Chalabi, I fear that reservoir damage could be irreversible. What a mess Iraq has to face in dealing with its important source of income!
While Iraqi religious leaders and politicians are busy arranging their priorities and demands to govern themselves in the new Iraq, and the US is arranging its honorable exit with accomplishing its mission, I believe that Iraqi oil experts in exile should not stay on the side in a wait-and-see position. I encourage them to cooperate with the oil ministry's staff to start the concerted efforts to draw up the needed plans on how to introduce and initiate reservoir management to the Iraqi oil and gas fields.
I hope that by the next CERA annual energy conference in 2005, Mr. Al-Chabali will be able to present how Iraq will undertake its responsibility to manage its reservoirs properly, and upgrade Iraq's reservoirs from the textbook example of the severely mismanaged reservoirs to the best managed reservoirs.
C. T. Sawabini
Reservoir Management Consultant
San Marino, Calif.
