The aftermath of terrorist attacks in the US on Sept. 11, 2001, has shined harsh light on a longstanding alliance of the world's biggest consumer of oil and the world's largest holder of oil re- serves. The image emerging of Saudi Arabia in the West isn't flattering. Like many images coaxed into view by strong glare, however, the common one obscures too much.
Prominent in the popular view of Saudi Arabia is Wahhabism, a very strict interpretation of Islam that results from an 18th Century reform movement. Although most Saudis claim not to embrace its exclusionary theology, Wahhabism dominates Saudi mosques and holds semiofficial status under an historic agreement between king and clergy. But it's not the whole story.
Oversimplification
"UEquating the kingdom with Wahhabism," argues Richard Dekmejian, professor of political science at the University of Southern California, "is a gross oversimplification." In the summer 2003 issue of The Middle East Journal, he describes a "liberal impulse" in the kingdom, energized for the third time in Saudi history by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. This latest push for Saudi liberalization received a boost from terrorist bombings May 12 in Riyadh, a jolt Dekmejian calls the most important factor in the timing and nature of whatever reforms ultimately take effect.
Liberalism in Saudi Arabia is a relative term. Dekmejian describes it as various forces for "reforms within the existing monarchical order, such as constitutionalism modernization, political participation, human rights for all, including women and minorities, relaxation of religious controls, and the right to challenge the dominant position of the Islamist establishment."
Each of the kingdom's flirtations with non-Islamist reform has come in response to challenges from outside. Besides the current one, other nudges toward change came from the pan-Arab political movement led by Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasir during 1955-67 and from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91. The earlier liberalizing tide ebbed when Faysal ibn Abd al-Aziz became king and strengthened the royal family's ties with the Wahhabis and international Islamists. The latter succumbed to a traditionalist backlash against presence of US-led, non-Muslim outsiders in Saudi Arabia during the war. A group called the Salafis, rooted in Wahhabism, led that reactionary movement. It remains the main force for religious xenophobia in Saudi Arabia.
According to Dekmejian, the Sept. 11 attacks provoked a storm of contradictory internal and external pressures in the kingdom, to which the Saudi leadership responded by relaxing controls over public discourse. The move advanced the reformist agenda of Crown Prince Abdallah and put Islamists on the defensive by ideological association with Al-Qaeda terrorists. "Clearly, this was a propitious time for the liberals to stage a comeback after being marginalized by the officially sanctioned Islamists for over 3 decades," Dekmejian writes.
Last January, the crown prince received a remarkable document called "Strategic Vision for the Present and Future" signed by 104 professors, intellectuals, and former officials. Carefully founding their appeal in Muslim principles, the authors envision a "state of constitutional institutions" embracing concepts with which Saudi Arabia has no experience. These include separation of powers, judicial independents, guaranteed rights for everyone, including women, government accountability, and an elected Shura Council. Dekmejian calls these "major demands that require significant changes in Saudi methods of governance."
It's encouraging to learn of a Saudi intellectual movement capable of producing so bold a vision. The extent to which the vision becomes reality will be crucial to future flows of crude oil and international capital. For now, however, it's just a document.
Social force
Dekmejian characterizes Saudi Arabia's liberal impulse as "a growing social force in Saudi politics" but not yet a well-organized political movement. Its future depends on a divided royalty. It receives strongest support from Prince Talal, a champion of reform in the 1960s now prohibited from holding office. Prince Nayif, the interior minister, represents the other end of the political spectrum. Crown Prince Abdallah holds a position between those extremes and has been frustrated in his initiatives for opening society and addressing corruption by opposition from conservative family members.
This internal call for reform in Saudi Arabia is healthy and important. It deserves more attention in the US and other western countries than it has received.
