Bombs in Saudi Arabia

May 19, 2003
Pressure builds on the House of Saud, controller of the most important single source of crude oil in world trade.

Pressure builds on the House of Saud, controller of the most important single source of crude oil in world trade.

On May 12 gunmen and suicide bombers thought to be members of Al-Qaeda attacked three residential communities in Riyadh, killing—at this writing—25 people and injuring scores of others. At least nine terrorists also died.

The obvious targets were expatriates living in the stricken neighborhoods. This is nothing new. A priority aim of Al-Qaeda is to kill westerners, especially Americans, and Jews of any nationality. The group made this clear even before its Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the US.

The other target

The Riyadh bombings, however, also magnify the other target in the sights of Al-Qaeda Kalashnikovs: Saudi Arabia's royal family. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has been explicit about this. And the royal family has responded by declaring Al-Qaeda to be in near defeat and turning a newly blind eye to clerics preaching xenophobic radicalism.

Thirty-four deaths attest that Al-Qaeda is not in defeat. And mosques are proving to be better at generating violence than at venting political pressure. The kingdom deserves forbearance for having had to cram several centuries' worth of economic progress into 3 decades. Its strains come from trying to modernize physically without changing culturally.

The problems start at the top. The royal family is too big, too rich, and too autocratic. And it remains too beholden—under an 18th century alliance of convenience with a zealous Muslim reformer—to the clergy. Nonroyal Saudis have too little influence in government. Creation in 1992 of the Majlis al-Shura, a parliament of sorts, didn't change the power structure. Since then, population growth, high rates of unemployment, and deterioration of once-lavish government services have aggravated discontent.

The murky dualism of Saudi authority has sustained a delusion that Saudi Arabia can have it both ways in the choice between a sentimentally remembered past and a frightfully uncertain future. No more. The royal family must make a choice and convince most Saudis that it's the right one. And the choice must be the future. As a national vision, retrogression always leads to grief.

For the sake of its nation, the Saudi government must join the US and other governments in the fight against murder disguised as a religious movement. That means supporting international investigations of suspected terrorists in Saudi Arabia. It means allowing foreigners to move around freely and ask questions. It's obvious now, after the escape of 19 Al-Qaeda members during the May 6 raid on a house full of weapons in Riyadh, that the Saudi government can't do the job alone. It's also obvious that the government itself is a target.

The kingdom also must show real progress toward popular governance. The majlis needs more authority, which means the royal family has to cede power. This doesn't have to happen overnight and probably shouldn't. But Saudi Arabia has to evolve from government by the powerful toward government by the governed. A government threatened from within must recognize the need.

While a government answerable to the people remains a long-term ideal in Saudi Arabia—at least to outsiders—a government in communication with the people is urgently necessary. It wouldn't hurt the Saudi government's credibility to publicly renounce those earlier assurances about Al-Qaeda's weakness. The facts since May 12 speak for themselves. Admission of official error coupled with a statement of resolve to prevent further violence would do wonders.

Combat of ideas

Similarly, a government heretofore inclined to ignore provocation should answer—not muzzle—the radical clerics. It should combat destructive ideas with better ones. The intolerance that gushes without challenge from many Saudi mosques misrepresents Islam as the rest of the world understands the faith. Saudi turbulence isn't, as bin Laden would insist, about Islam, anyway; it's about power.

The conflict in Saudi Arabia is serious. It's not Islam vs. infidels or Saudis vs. outsiders. It's those who kill indiscriminately to get their way vs. everyone else. Saudi Arabia has just received a new compulsion to finish its excursion into the modern world. It won't abandon Islam by responding with a renewed commitment to the future. But it has to make the choice.